Abstract: This paper deals with a production model involving one manufacturer who produces two products. One product adopts green technology and we term the product as 'green' product, and the other product, with regular production technique, termed 'regular' product. In this paper, we formulate models to examine the impact of production for two products under cap-and-trade policy. Analytical results are obtained: with cap-and-trade policy, the manufacture's maximum quantity for product 1 and product 2 is lower than the case without carbon emission constraint, and the expected profit of the manufacturer under this situation depends on initial allowance. To cope with the increasing awareness of environmental protection, firms are required to apply some green technologies to produce 'greener' products. General economics concepts are achieved. That is, the green technology input could improve the manufacture's normal product quantities and expected profit to some degree.
Introduction
IEA (2007) reported that since the industrial revolution, human activity is a major factor in the rise of the greenhouse gases -an additional 1% of GDP is brought by extra 0.47 units of energy consumption. As a result, IPCC (2007) pointed out increasing temperatures and extreme weather conditions have had a significant impact on quality of life, especially in terms of the environment. For the purposes of environmental protection, governments introduce cap-and-trade policies which combine government control with market forces to limit emissions from manufactures. Tang et al. (2014) mentioned this policy is putting pressure on manufacturers. Dan et al. (2014) indicated limit emissions makes the management decision more complex. Wang et al. (2014) in their research stated briefly carbon emission reduction has been considered as one of production company objectives; On the other hand, green technology input and carbon emission trading quantities have been playing a special role in the decision-making process. For customers, they tend to purchase greener product which brings social responsibility. Hence, manufacturers have made environmental preservation a priority.
The two main issues examined in this paper are:
1 green technologies 2 production strategy under a carbon trading policy.
There are several streams of related literature, each addressing different subsets of these issues. The papers on the inter-temporal issue are closely related to our work. He and Ma (2011) developed a pricing model with carbon trading through an economic order quantity model. Although this problem is analytically complex, we aim to find an approach to control product quantities in each period. Du et al. (2009) discuss how to establish an enterprise production model integrating the green technology input. Li et al. (2007) establish the manufacturer's green technology input strategy model under technical uncertainty. Recently, production coordination in supply chain becomes the hot topic and a lot of scholars begin to research it. For example, Gong et al. (2017) think incentive theory is an important way to solve the production coordination problem, and they apply incentive contract model to help leading firms to optimise production modes and obtain production coordination while considering common factors; market returns differences. But, the production strategy under a carbon trading policy which is the most closely research related to our work is focused by a few scholars. This stream of papers focuses on the opportunities provided by the carbon emission trading market. Chaabane et al. (2012) considered a sustainable supply chain model under a carbon trading scheme in the aluminium production industry. Benjaafar et al. (2013) were among the first scholars to focus on enterprise operation strategy under a carbon emission policy. They designed effective production and inventory strategies with carbon trading. Liu et al. (2014) formulated an operational multi-objective optimisation model incorporating both economic and environmental performance. Several simulation examples and an industrial case demonstrate that carbon trading is an incentive scheme that encourages firms to reduce pollution. Ma and Luo (2016) studied production activities under a carbon cap and a carbon trading policy and also considered green technology efforts. The results showed that the manufacturer's maximum quantity under carbon trading depends on the price of the carbon emission allowance, while simultaneously, green technology inputs can improve the manufacturer's production quantities and expected profit to some degree. Hua et al. (2016) considered carbon-constrained perishable inventory management with freshness-dependent demand. And conduct simulation to generate managerial insights from their analytical results.
Although the importance of the production model is recognised by many existing models, its implications for carbon trading policy has not been widely studied. We allow for combinations of both of these factors and believe that we can capture a good representation of reality. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The problem description and assumptions is presented in Section 2. Basic model is in Section 3.1. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we discuss the manufacturer's optimal production policies in the presence of carbon caps and carbon trading, respectively. Section 3.4 develops some structural properties and discusses green technology input in the manufacturer's optimal production policies. Section 4 presents our findings and possible future directions. 
Problem description and assumptions
There is a monopolist manufacturer selling two products to the market with stochastic demand. As for the electric bulb market, for example, manufacturer meets the demands of two consumer groups and offers the products to them. Product 1, which is called 'green bulb' is produced by green technology, whereas product 2 is produced by regular techniques and it is called the 'regular bulb'. Before the production period (for example, one year), the manufacture receives the mandatory standard and initial allocation of emission allowances. Manufactures could trade them in a free market. Finally, all remaining units are sold at the salvage price. Therefore, based on the situation which approached to reality, we assume:
1 The unit carbon emission of products 1 and 2 are fixed. At the same time, the manufacturer's carbon emissions capacity in production activities could not exceed the mandatory standard K.
This condition indicates that the manufacturer has access to a profit when a unit of product is sold in the consumer market. By contrast, it gives the manufacturer an incentive because producing the appropriate product quantities could mitigate losses stemming from a negative penalty.
3 In this paper, we assume that the manufacturer puts some effort into greening its operations, where the cost of greening increases rapidly with the level of green technology.
In addition, the various parameters in this paper are denoted as follows: Carbon emission of products 1 and 2, respectively, with k 1 < k 2 .
θ 1 (Q 1 ) and θ 2 (Q 2 ) The manufacturer's marginal profit gained from a unit of product 1 or product 2.
T
The level of green technology input for product 2.
w Price of one unit of carbon emissions when trading in the market.
Cost of product 2 after green technology efforts.
Modelling
In this section, four models are considered. We first formulate the model without the constraint. The 2nd model we formulate is to incorporate an additional cap constraint. The 3rd model, being extended from the second one, we assume that the manufacture could trade them in a free market. In the 4th model, we mainly consider the effect of green technology under cap-and-trade regulation.
The production model for two products without constraint
First, we discuss the case without a carbon emission allowance. We construct the following expected total profit function:
Then, we get the optimal quantities:
This demonstrates that there is a profit-maximising level of output, and anyone wants to pay the market price can get a product.
The production strategy for two products under cap model
In this section, we discuss the case with a carbon cap. The manufacturer meets the carbon emission allowances. Thus, the manufacturer will decide the production quantity so as to maximise his expected profit. The manufactures' expected profit is:
that is, manufacturer's marginal profit gained from a unit of product 1. Similarly, θ 2 (Q 2 ) represents the manufacturer's marginal profit gained from a unit of product 2.
As for the optimal production policies, the following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 1:
With an additional cap constraint, the manufacturer's optimal production quantities for product 1 and product 2 satisfy:
and . 
If φ > 0, we get:
, .
a a Q Q Q Q This completes the proof. Proposition 1 extends previous research. It means that if the government's initial carbon emission allowances are low, the carbon emissions are binding, and the manufacturer should produce a lower quantity (i.e., 1 a Q or 2 a Q ). By contrast, there is no difference between the manufacturer's production quantity with a carbon cap and the case without when the carbon emission is not binding. Proposition 1 also shows a general result: when the government imposes carbon cap policy, a shortage of product develops, and manufacturer must ration the scarce products among the large number of buyers. a a a a a n a a a a a n a a
Lemma 1:
Above all, we obtain
a a a n π Q Q π Q Q This completes the proof.
Lemma 1 demonstrates that the manufacturer couldn't benefit from this policy because of a shortage. But, carbon cap policy could effectively reduce carbon emissions generated by the manufacturer.
The production strategy for two products under cap and trade model
In this situation, the manufacture could trade carbon emission allowance on the market to maximise expected profit:
The constraint condition states that carbon dioxide emitted in the production process should not be allowed to exceed the initial carbon emission allowance required by the government, but the carbon trading case gives the manufacturer an instant ability to trade the additional quantity in the external market:
1 when E i > 0, the manufacturer will buy additional credits from the external market 2 when E i = 0, the manufacturer will neither buy nor sell any carbon emission credits in the external market 3 when E i < 0, the manufacturer will sell the redundant credits in the external market. 
kw ], so the manufacturer will buy carbon emission credits from the outside market, and the optimal quantities with carbon trading will be higher than in the case with a carbon cap. The cost of purchasing carbon emission credits can be regarded as manufacturer's 'penalties'. By contrast, in the case of ( ) ,
θ Q kw the manufacturer will sell redundant carbon emission credits in the outside market, and the optimal quantities with carbon trading will be lower than in the case with a carbon cap. The profit of selling carbon emission credits can be regarded as manufacturer's 'rewards'.
Denote the maximum expected profit of the manufacture under cap-and-trade policy as: . a e Q Q Q Proposition 3 the manufacturer's optimal production quantities of products 1 and 2 are both lower than the case without a carbon emission constraint. We also know that the marginal profit from producing one more unit of product (1 or 2) is higher than the cost of purchasing carbon emission credits, so the manufacturer will buy carbon emission credits from the outside market, and the optimal quantities with carbon trading will be higher than in the case with a carbon cap. By contrast, in the case of
w the manufacturer will sell redundant carbon emission credits in the outside market, and the optimal quantities with carbon trading will be lower than in the case with a carbon cap. However, when the marginal profit of producing one more unit of product (1 or 2) is equal to the cost of purchasing a one unit carbon emission credit [i.e.,
, the manufacturer will not trade with the outside market. As to the effect of carbon emission allowances, the following proposition is obtained. 
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This completes the proof. Proposition 4 proves that carbon trading is an incentive scheme that encourages manufacturers to reduce pollution. The manufacturer could gain expected profits by buying or selling carbon emission credits on the market. In practice, manufacturer should manage carbon emission credits and policy maker should notice speculation (from 'manufacturer' to 'dealer') in carbon trading market.
The production strategy for two products under cap-and-trade model with green technology
In recent years, issues such as new technologies have become increasingly important, and the resulting business practices have been adopted by some firms in the US and in the European Union to reduce emissions and exhaust fumes in the environment. In this paper, we consider the manufacturer as having expressed some strong opinions about the adoption of green practices and having put in some effort to green its operations. Denote T as the level of green technology input and where c 2 (T) means the unit cost of product 2 after green technology has been adopted. The manufacturer's decision-making model is:
1 1 2 2
(1 )
However, it is inevitable that production costs increase when green technologies are adopted, and in turn, the product cost increases. The objective of our research is to examine the effect of various parameters.
Conclusions
In this paper, we study a monopolist manufacturer producing and selling a single product to the market with stochastic demand and carbon trading. The manufacturer makes decision on production quantity and examines the effect of various parameters, such as greening efforts and the cost of greening. From our analysis, we draw some important managerial insights. Firm's carbon emissions could be reduced when carbon cap and carbon trading policy are implemented. But, carbon trading is a more incentive scheme that encourages firms to reduce pollution. In addition, the adoption of green practices actually carries many important benefits, both in environment and finance. In practice, manufacturer should manage carbon emission credits ('manufacturer' and 'dealer') in carbon trading market and have a deep understanding about green technology efforts. This paper makes two main contributions. First, we solve the production problem. The model in this paper is very different from traditional work, for example, Kincaid and Darling (1963) and many others ignored the effect of carbon emissions. Our second contribution is that the results presented in this paper are widely applicable to all practitioners and to most industries: the above-mentioned bulb manufacturer who supplies the regular and green product can easily obtain optimality as the probability density function of demand is confirmed. For future research, the assumption of a monopoly manufacturer will be relaxed, and a multiple market structure will be considered. Moreover, we will allow the price of the carbon emission allowance to fluctuate.
